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Abstract
We consider a private information replica of the dynamic matching and bargaining
model of Mortensen and Wright (2002). We find that private information typically
deters entry. But, the welfare can actually be higher under private information.
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1 Introduction
Can private information improve the eﬃciency of bargaining? This is an important question
for the design of bargaining institutions. In this letter, we show that it can if bargaining is
embedded in a dynamic matching market. We do so by comparing equilibrium outcomes of
two steady-state models of search and bargaining. The first is the full information take-it-or-
leave-it bargaining model of Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1985, 1990), but with heterogeneous
traders as in Gale (1986, 1987), and with a general matching technology as in Mortensen
and Wright (2002). The second is the private information replica of Mortensen and Wright
(2002), recently investigated in Shneyerov and Wong (2010a,b).
Mortensen and Wright (2002) and Shneyerov and Wong (2010a) have shown that for
suﬃciently small discount rate, in each model there is a unique full trade equilibrium: every
∗The results appearing in this paper were originally contained in the 2006 version of Shneyerov and Wong
(2010a). We thank the editor of this journal and an anonymous referee for their comments.
†Corresponding author. Tel.: +1 514 848 2424 ext 5288. Fax: +1 514 848 4536
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meeting results in trade.1 In this letter, we consider the case of a small discount factor, and
therefore restrict attention to full trade equilibria.
In a full trade equilibrium, there is less entry relative to the frictionless, Walrasian
benchmark; the marginal participating buyer type is higher than the Walrasian price, and
the marginal participating seller type is lower. Therefore, the ineﬃciency arises only because
of costly delay and insuﬃcient entry. The cost of delay is due to the discounting and also,
importantly, due to the explicit search cost.
When there is no discounting, the equilibrium outcomes in both models are the same,
and hence welfare is also the same. When r increases by a small amount dr, the cost of
delay due to discounting increases in both models by the same marginal amount. The cost of
search, however, is aﬀected only under full information. Shneyerov and Wong (2010a) show
that under private information, the marginal participating types do not change; the entry
margin and the search cost are not aﬀected. But under full information, the analysis in
Mortensen and Wright (2002) implies that the marginal types move towards the Walrasian
price, and hence there is more entry.
These entering traders increase the cost of search on their own side, at the same time
reducing the cost of search on the other side. These eﬀects are first-order in dr. Because
the marginal types only make profit on the order of dr, and the entry margin itself is also
of the order dr, the contribution of the entrants’ own welfare is of the second order.
We consider a constant returns to scale matching technology. The search cost incurred
by a trader until the next meeting depends depends on equilibrium through the ratio ζ of
buyers and sellers in the market (market tightness). The search cost is minimized at some
ζ = ζ∗ that only depends on model primitives. Under private information, we show that
the cost of search is minimized in a full trade equilibrium when the proposal probabilities
satisfy the Hosios (1990) condition. Under full information, then, entry can either increase
or decrease the search cost, depending on whether ζ moves farther away or closer to ζ∗. The
welfare under full information can be either higher or lower than under private information.
We derive a precise condition for this eﬀect.
In a model diﬀerent from ours, with one-time entry of traders and costless search, the
welfare-improving eﬀect of private information was first noticed by Moreno and Wooders
(2001). They provide a numerical example showing that welfare can be slightly higher under
private information, but do not address this issue formally.
We are aware of only one other paper that contains formal results on the comparison
of full and private information. Lauermann (2011) considers a model with no search cost,
only with the exogenous exit of traders as in Satterthwaite and Shneyerov (2008). More-
over, sellers are homogeneous, with cost normalized to 0, and only they make oﬀers. He
finds that equilibria converge to eﬃciency only under private information, and therefore
the welfare is large than under full information when frictions are small. This is because,
under full information, the sellers always obtain certain rents from their oﬀers, which are
only acceptable to buyers with large enough values; whereby, ineﬃciency persists even in
the limit. Although his message is similar, the nature of Lauermann (2011)’s model and
results is very diﬀerent from ours.
1Satterthwaite and Shneyerov (2007) have shown existence of such equilibria in a dynamic matching
model with auctions.
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2 The Models
We begin by reviewing the models of Mortensen and Wright (2002) (hereafter MW) and
Shneyerov and Wong (2010a), but focus only on the essential details. There are potential
buyers and sellers of a homogeneous, indivisible good. Potential buyers and sellers are
continuously born at rates b > 0 and s > 0. Each buyer wants at most 1 unit of the good,
each seller has 1 unit. All traders are risk neutral. The types of new-born traders are
drawn at the time of their birth and remain the same throughout their life in the market.
Buyers draw their valuations v ∈ [0, 1] i.i.d. from distribution F and the sellers draw their
costs c ∈ [0, 1] i.i.d. from distribution G. We assume that F and G have densities on [0, 1]
bounded away from 0 and∞. Time is continuous and infinite horizon. The agents discount
future utility at the instantaneous rate r.
Once born, each trader decides whether to enter the market. Those who do not enter
get zero payoﬀ. Those who enter incur the search cost continuously at the rates κB > 0 and
κS > 0, until they leave the market.
We model the process of search by the means of a matching functionM (B,S) that gives
the rate of matching as a function of the mass of active buyers B and the mass of active
sellers S. The function M (i) is continuous on R2+, (ii) is nondecreasing in each argument,
(iii) satisfies M (0, S) = M (B, 0) = 0, and (iv) exhibits constant returns to scale. Denote
by ζ ≡ B/S the (steady-state) ratio of active buyers to sellers. The arrival rates for buyers
and sellers are
￿B (ζ) ≡M(ζ, 1)/ζ, ￿S (ζ) ≡M(ζ, 1). (1)
Once a pair of buyer and seller is matched, they bargain either under full or private
information. With probability αS ∈ (0, 1), the seller makes a final oﬀer to the buyer, and
with probability αB = 1−αS , the buyer proposes and the seller responds. If a type v buyer
and a type c seller trade at a price p, then they leave the market with payoﬀs v−p, and p−c
respectively. If the bargaining breaks down, both traders return to the pool of unmatched
traders and search again.
Let WB (v) and WS (c) be traders’ equilibrium values of search. A buyer of type v will
accept any price oﬀer p if v − p > WB (v), and similarly any seller of type c will accept
any price oﬀer p if p − c > WS (c). The responding strategies are therefore characterized
by the reservation prices v − WB (v) for the buyers and c + WS (c) for the sellers. The
proposing strategies diﬀer according to whether the information is full or private. Under
full information, a type v buyer and a type c seller trade if and only if v−c ≥WS (c)+WB (v),
in which case the proposer proposes his partner’s reservation price, i.e. either c + WS (c)
or v −WB (v). Under private information, the proposing strategies are chosen to maximize
expected continuation payoﬀs given the market distributions of their partners’ reservation
prices.
We focus on a simple class of nontrivial steady-state equilibria, full trade equilibria, in
which every meeting results in trade. The only equilibrium components that will matter for
us here are (i) v and c¯, the marginal participating types of buyers and sellers
v ≡ inf {v : WB (v) > 0} , c¯ ≡ sup {c : WS (c) > 0} ,
and (ii) ζ, the steady state ratio of the market stocks of buyers (B) and sellers (S). Shneyerov
and Wong (2010a) prove several properties of a full trade equilibrium in the private infor-
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mation model. First, the supports for active buyers’ types and active sellers’ types are
separate, i.e. v > c¯. This is because otherwise a buyer with v will not trade if he meets a
seller with c¯: the seller will not propose or accept anything less than c¯, while the buyer will
only propose or accept something below v. Second, under private information, the lowest
buyer’s (and hence all active buyers’) oﬀer is exactly at the level just acceptable to all active
sellers, i.e. is equal to c¯; and similarly, the highest seller’s (and hence all active sellers’) oﬀer
is exactly at the level just acceptable to all active buyers, i.e. equal to v.
Mortensen and Wright (2002) and Shneyerov and Wong (2010a) show that the Walrasian
price pW , defined as the unique solution to sG (p) = b [1− F (p)], falls in between the
marginal participating types: pW ∈ (c¯, v).
We index the private (resp. full) information equilibrium objects by p (resp. by f).
Under private information, the full trade equilibrium admits a very simple characterization.
The marginal traders must be indiﬀerent between participating or not, which leads to the
following two indiﬀerence equations:
￿B(ζp)αB
￿
vp − c¯p
￿
= κB, (2)
￿S(ζp)αS
￿
vp − c¯p
￿
= κS . (3)
The intuition of (2) is that, first, the marginal buyers make positive profit only when they
propose. Second, they propose c¯p. Because marginal buyers make 0 expected net profit,
their expected profit rate from bargaining, ￿B(ζp)αB
￿
vp − c¯p
￿
, must be equal to κB, the
rate of their search cost. The intuition for (3) is parallel.
From (1), ￿S(ζp)/￿B(ζp) = ζp, so (2) and (3) can be easily solved for ζp and vp − c¯p:
ζp =
αB
αS
κS
κB
, (4)
vp − c¯p = K (ζp) , (5)
where
K (ζ) ≡ κB
￿B(ζ)
+
κS
￿S(ζ)
.
A necessary condition for existence of a full trade equilibrium is that K (ζp) < 1, which we
assume throughout this paper.
Since successful traders leave the market in matched pairs, in steady state, the inflow of
active buyers must equal the inflow of active sellers:
b[1− F ￿vp￿] = sG (c¯p) . (6)
Since vp− c¯p is determined from (5), vp and c¯p are uniquely pinned down by (6). Note that
neither the marginal participating types nor ζp depend on r. The triple
￿
ζp, vp, c¯p
￿
may not
always characterize an equilibrium, because the marginal buyers may have an incentive to
oﬀer prices below c¯p, and marginal sellers – to oﬀer prices above vp. However, Shneyerov
and Wong (2010a, Proposition 3) show that when r is small these solutions do characterize
an equilibrium and this equilibrium is unique. Further, the search values of buyers and
sellers are given by
WBp(v) =
￿B (ζp)
r + ￿B (ζp)
￿
v − vp
￿
, WSp(c) =
￿S (ζp)
r + ￿S (ζp)
(c¯p − c) . (7)
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The total utility flow of the arriving buyers and sellers is
Wp (r) = b
ˆ 1
vp
WBp(v)dF (v) + s
ˆ c¯p
0
WSp(c)dG (c) . (8)
The characterization of a full trade equilibrium in the full information model is slightly
more complicated because the payoﬀs of the marginal types depend on the market distribu-
tion of partner types, not only on the marginal partner type. Because each meeting results
in trade, these distributions are truncations of the original distributions of types in the
arriving flows, i.e. are equal to F (v)
1−F(vf)
for buyers and G(c)
G(c¯f)
for sellers. Now ζf , vf and c¯f
are functions of r implicitly determined by the equations parallel to the private information
model:
￿B (ζf )αB
ˆ c¯f
0
￿
vf − c−WSf (c)
￿ dG (c)
G (c¯f )
= κB, (9)
￿S (ζf )αS
ˆ 1
vf
[v −WBf (v)− c¯f ] dF (v)
1− F ￿vf￿ = κS , (10)
b
￿
1− F (vf )
￿
= sG(c¯f ), (11)
where
WBf (v) =
αB￿B (ζf )
r + αB￿B (ζf )
￿
v − vf
￿
, WSf (c) =
αS￿S (ζf )
r + αS￿S (ζf )
(c¯f − c) .
MW (in Proposition 1) show that, for r > 0 small, there is a unique solution
￿
ζf (r) , vf (r) , c¯f (r)
￿
to (9) - (11) and it has vf > c¯f . This solution characterizes a unique equilibrium. The total
utility flow of the arriving buyers and sellers, Wf (r), is obtained in parallel to (8).
3 How Private Information Can Be Good For Eﬃciency
When r = 0, the buyer-seller ratio and the marginal participating types in full trade equilib-
ria of both models are equal: ζf (0) = ζp, vf (0) = vp and c¯f (0) = c¯p. In a private-information
full-trade equilibrium, vp and c¯p do not depend on r. Let
WB0 ≡ b
ˆ 1
vp
￿
v − vp
￿
dF (v) , WS0 ≡ s
ˆ c¯p
0
(c¯p − c) dG (c)
be the total search values of the arriving flows of buyers and sellers when r = 0. When
there is no discounting, they are the same in both models. Therefore, in order to compare
welfare under full and private information for small r, it is suﬃcient to compare the marginal
changes in the welfare, dWp and dWf , as a result of the marginal change in the discount
rate dr > 0. Direct calculations show that
dWp = −
￿
WB0
￿B (ζp)
+
WS0
￿S (ζp)
￿
dr, (12)
dWf = −
￿
1
αB
WB0
￿B (ζp)
+
1
αS
WS0
￿S (ζp)
￿
dr + sG (c¯p)
￿
dc¯f − dvf
￿
. (13)
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Under full information, the marginal types are closer to each other than they are under
private information. Implicitly diﬀerentiating the system (9)-(11) and eliminating dc¯f , dvf
we obtain
dc¯f − dvf =
dr
sG (c¯p)
￿
σS
WB0
αB￿B (ζp)
+ σB
WS0
αS￿S (ζp)
￿
> 0. (14)
where σS (ζ) ≡ SM2 (B,S) /M (B,S), σB (ζ) ≡ BM1 (B,S) /M (B,S) = 1 − σS are the
elasticities of the matching function with respect to the masses of sellers and buyers.
In both models, the marginal entrants get zero rent from bargaining when they respond.
Under full information, the marginal entrants extract full rents from the partners when
they propose. In contrast, under private information, the marginal entrants are only able to
extract the rents of the most ineﬃcient partner type when they propose. If r = 0, this makes
no diﬀerence because there is no heterogeneity in the partners’ reservation prices.2 When
r > 0, the distributions of reservation prices becomes heterogeneous, and there are rents to
be extracted under full information. Of course, the marginal entrants have to be indiﬀerent
between entering or not. Hence under full information less eﬃcient types of traders enter. 3
Substituting dc¯f − dvf from (14), we obtain after some algebra
dWf = dWp − sG (c¯p)K ￿(ζp)dζf . (15)
This decomposition is intuitive. Under private information, increasing the discount rate
from 0 to a small dr > 0 leads to welfare loss given by the r.h.s. of (12) because buyers
and sellers in the arriving flow have expected search times until the next profitable trade
given by 1/￿B (ζp) and 1/￿S (ζp), and have their utilities discounted proportionately over
those time periods. But under full information, there is also an indirect entry eﬀect of
discounting: (14) implies that the full information model has more entry. The new entrants
congest the market for their own side, and provide a thicker market for the other side. The
entry of traders could increase or decrease the buyer-seller ratio ζf , which in turn aﬀects the
expected searching times. The r.h.s. of (15) is the indirect eﬀect on the total accumulated
search costs incurred by the flow of buyers and sellers.
Proposition. We have
Sign K ￿ (ζp) = Sign (σS (ζp)− αS) ,
Sign dζf = Sign
￿
WS0
κS
− WB0
κB
￿
.
Therefore, for all suﬃciently small r > 0, the private information welfare Wp (r) is higher
(resp. lower) than the full information welfare Wf (r), if the signs on the r.h.s. are the
same (resp., diﬀerent).
For a concrete example, consider the Cobb-Douglas matching technology, M (B,S) =
BσBSσS , where σS ∈ (0, 1) ,σB = 1 − σS are constants. Under this matching technology,
private information can increase welfare if σS > αS and WS0κS >
WB0
κB
.
To gain more intuition for our main result, consider the total cost of searchK (ζ) incurred
by an incoming pair of buyer and seller. In Appendix, we show that its derivative K ￿ (ζ) has
2When r = 0, v −WB (v) and c+WS (c) are constants in both models.
3See also Lemma 1 in Chapter 3 of Wong (2009).
6
the same sign as ζ− σB(ζ)σS(ζ)
κS
κB
. If K (ζ) has a unique minimum, as it does in the case of Cobb-
Douglas matching technology above, K (ζ) is minimized at ζ∗ satisfying ζ∗ = σB(ζ∗)σS(ζ∗)
κS
κB
. Note
that ζ∗ = ζp when the Hosios condition is satisfied: σS (ζp) = αS . If say ζp > ζ∗, K ￿ (ζp) > 0,
and the search cost increases in response to a marginal change dζ > 0. Thus, whether the
welfare is higher or lower under full information depends on whether the market tightness
ζf moves closer or farther away from the optimal level ζ∗ in response to the marginal change
in the discount rate dr.
Appendix: Proof of the Proposition
Since K (ζ) = (ζκB + κS) /M (ζ, 1), we have
K ￿ (ζ) =
1
M (ζ, 1)2
[κBM (ζ, 1)−M1 (ζ, 1) (ζκB + κS)]
Using σB = BM1 (B,S) /M (B,S), which is also equal to 1− σS under constant returns to
scale, the above expression can be manipulated to the form
K ￿ (ζ) =
κBσS (ζ)
ζM (ζ, 1)
￿
ζ − σB (ζ)
σS (ζ)
κS
κB
￿
.
Therefore the sign of K ￿(ζ) is the same as that of ζ − σB(ζ)σS(ζ)
κS
κB
. As ζp = αBαS
κS
κB
, K ￿ (ζp) has
the same sign as either αB − σB (ζp) or σS (ζ)− αS .
To derive the sign of dζf , divide the buyers’ marginal type equation (9) through by
￿B (ζf ), apply integration by parts to the integral in the left-hand side, diﬀerentiate through
at r = 0, and rearrange. One then obtains
αB
￿
dvf − dc¯f +
WS0
sαS￿S (ζp)G (c¯p)
dr
￿
= −κB ￿
￿
B (ζp)
￿B (ζp)
2dζf . (16)
Working with the sellers’ marginal type equation (10) in the same fashion, we have
αS
￿
dvf − dc¯f +
WB0
bαB￿B (ζp)
￿
1− F ￿vp￿￿dr
￿
= −κS ￿
￿
S (ζp)
￿S (ζp)
2dζf (17)
Equations (16) and (17) can be solved for dvf − dc¯f and dζf . After some rewriting, we get
dc¯f − dvf =
1
sG (c¯p)
￿
σSWB0
αB￿B (ζp)
+
σBWS0
αS￿S (ζp)
￿
dr,
dζf =
K (ζp)
sG (c¯p)
￿
κS
αS
￿￿S (ζp)
￿S (ζp)
2 −
κB
αB
￿￿B (ζp)
￿B (ζp)
2
￿−1￿
WS0
κS
− WB0
κB
￿
dr. (18)
As ￿￿S(ζ) > 0 and ￿￿B(ζ) < 0, it follows that the sign of dζf is the same as that of
WS0
κS
− WB0κB .
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